AUKUS: Its Strategic Importance and What it Means for U.S. Allies and Quad Partners

By Katherine Sharp – Contributor

The United States has long-maintained alliances with the United Kingdom and Australia by military cooperation and shared security concerns in the international community. Recently on September 15,  2021, the U.S. announced its formation of a new trilateral security pact with the United Kingdom and Australia known as AUKUS. This alliance will support both the security and strategic needs of each member nation in the Indo-Pacific as well as enabling Australia’s acquisition of much needed nuclear-powered submarines. This will enhance and streamline their navy’s research and defense capabilities. The effort will likely also provide Australia with some stability against Beijing’s threats of economic retaliation following Australia’s aggressive call for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19. In addition, this will also usher in a new strategic era of post-war on terrorism joint-cooperation. It will also serve as a basis for strengthening the Quad 2.0 and its potential for success despite possible threats on the horizon from India’s dual influences from Russia and the U.S.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) 2.0 is built upon the foundation of the original Quad that launched in 2007 and ultimately failed. This may have been in part to its informal alliance or casual grouping of countries with strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. After all, the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India, have historically shared somewhat common strategic goals in the region. The Quad 2.0 is better positioned for success despite its initial failed launch when viewed through the lens of a neorealist. It is important to note that neorealism proposes that states will act in their best interest and form alliances with other states that are against a common superior third-party enemy or specific cause when it jeopardizes their own security. Currently, these four countries share a common concern over China’s growing presence and maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific. This is a region that covers several continents, two oceans, and is predicted to facilitate the passage of nearly 50% of the global economy’s exports in 2022. With both security and economical influences at stake, the Quad 2.0 has a better chance of enduring success than its predecessor. As a result, it should not be casually dismissed on the basis of its troubled history alone.

Strategic Importance for the Indo-Pacific

AUKUS was a significant win for Australia as it clearly demonstrated the backing of the U.S. and the U.K. while experiencing increased economic threats from Beijing during April to November 2020. China eventually went on to ban many Australian exports and denying access to $1 billion worth of exports. This is significant as the Chinese economy normally accounted for about forty percent of Australia’s exports. AUKUS sends a clear message that neither Australia nor the U.S. is willing to observe and let China push its agenda in the Indo-Pacific. This pact may be further supported by regional allies in the Quad. The timely symbolism of the agreement is not lost either.

Australia was an important ally during the Global War on Terror when the country urgently passed bipartisan support to invoke the ANZUS treaty from 1951 immediately following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. This provided military support for Operation Enduring Freedom. As the U.S. continues to shift from focusing on terrorism to returning to strategic near-peer threats, the AUKUS pact ushers in a new partnership of modern military strength via the nuclear-powered submarines deal. In addition, it will likely further influence the cybersecurity, technology, and intelligence relationships as well. As the importance of tactical threats decrease and strategic ones increase, Australia is once again demonstrating its commitment to the AUKUS pact. Such presence of force will likely also further influence the impacts and reach of the Quad as the group’s mutual interests have expanded beyond Indo-Pacific security concerns. In recent history, the Quad cooperated on COVID-19 vaccine working groups, supply chain strengths, climate change, and innovative technology.

The Quad has served to unite countries that otherwise may not have engaged in shared goals as evident in the TALISMAN SABRE exercise in which Japan also participated with Australia and the U.S. in 2021. This bilateral defense exercise improved this trilateral relationship as well as having increased military combat readiness and “interoperability” between the U.S. and Australian military forces. Additionally, its strategic value lies in the demonstration of readiness and combat capabilities through airpower with little notice. This served as a message that China surely took notice when observing it. The exercise drew on the skills of over 17,000 people from seven nations that undoubtedly strengthened alliances and engagement with partners.

In addition, the Quad helped influence Japan to recognize India as a key component of the effort to oppose China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region through mutual engagement. Japan’s concerns focus on China’s frequent exercises into their territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands, possibly indicative of Chinese military expansion or intimidation tactics. Over the course of the last decade, China has risen to overtake Japan’s strategic power in the region. This has resulted into a shift in Japanese foreign policy that focuses on strategic engagement with allies and to firmly cement its place as a “first-tier nation.” Through engagement, collaboration, and dialogue in the Quad, the U.S. can bring her allies together in a common cause and work towards reducing China’s control in the Indo-Pacific region.

Quad 2.0 May Succeed Where the Original Failed

The original Quad launched in 2007 and rather failed at its mission. Despite the Quad’s previous history and slow start,  it is critical to view the current Quad 2.0 through the international relations lens of neorealism to avoid overlooking its strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific. The original Quad suffered from an ill-timed combination of poor timing and other priorities perceived as more threatening. In 2007, freshly elected Australian Prime Minister Rudd ordered the Foreign Minister to withdraw from the newly-minted Quad dialogue. This permanently damaged the relationship between Australia and India within the scope of the original Quad. Around the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Abe, a key supporter of the Quad, resigned, although he did go on to regain his office in 2012. Coupled with the renewed focus on China by the Obama and Trump administrations, the U.S. and the rest of the Quad now have fresh diverging interests in the Indo-Pacific. This is particularly apparent when it is viewed through the lens of neorealism, which bodes well for the new initiative’s success.

Both countries are geographically closer to China than the U.S. This is why they have more at stake in terms of physical proximity. Thus, as a whole, the Quad is better positioned to balance and deter the perceived threat through bilateral power across the four states. The Australian role helps to balance the power equation as the country is within striking distance of Chinese missiles. Although Australia is geographically further away, they will soon be equipped with modern defensive military weapons through the presence of nuclear-powered submarines.

Neorealist theory suggests that states can effectively and modestly deter a perceived aggressor from further expansion or increased tensions if they present a front of significant power. The increased military power in the region through AUKUS’ nuclear-power submarines will likely serve this purpose for the trilateral relationship. This will help strengthen the Quad and provide a show of security and force throughout the Indo-Pacific. In addition, this may also bolster their other economic and humanitarian work in fields such as science, medicine, and finance.

Australia’s most recent submarine deal with the U.S. follows their withdrawal from the original deal with France for diesel submarines. Such a decisive move demonstrates Austalian’s perception of the Chinese threat and their reliance on a larger world power to continue supplying them with military capabilities. The deal also gives the U.S. more influence in the region against Chinese expansion. China has demonstrated bold strategic moves with the construction of Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s southwestern Balochistan Province. Despite China’s assurances of the commercial interest, their increasing military presence in the Indian Ocean, coupled with the possibility of the Gwadar Port connecting the land and sea components of the Belt and Road Strategy, hints at other possible interests. At the very least, the U.S.-Australia nuclear-powered submarines deal bolsters defensive military posture in the region.

Potential Threats on the Horizon to the Quad 2.0

India and Russia have continued to develop international ties particularly in regards to energy and military defense. Among the countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Russia and China have a marked competitive edge over other strategic near-peer suppliers in the European Union (EU) and the U.S. due to significantly lower infrastructure costs. Currently, Russia provides Indian nuclear power plants with enriched fuel. One of the secondary impacts is that India retains the plutonium produced as a byproduct which could be used in nuclear weapons. India also relies on Russia for about two-thirds of their military defense equipment.

As a result, India has dual interests in the Quad 2.0 and Western influences contained therein while also maintaining a good diplomatic relationship with Russia for energy, economic, and military defense support. During the recent events of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, India has both spoken out against the deaths of civilians in Ukraine while also maintaining concern over sanctions on Russia that could impact their economy. This is evident in Russian ambassador designate to India Denis Alipov’s confidence in financial workarounds to Western sanctions. India’s economy, while supported by both Western and Russian markets, exports about $3 billion annually to Russia and imports more than $7 billion, thus placing India in a unique position. For the larger Quad 2.0, India’s situation may pose a threat to the unity and future of the Quad, should it eventually choose Russia, as it currently navigates both Western and Russian influences while maintaining their own economy and defense.

The unity and resolve of the Quad 2.0 may be tested within the next decade should China continue to put pressure on Taiwan or take military action in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia affirmed its position on a “one-China principle” regarding Taiwan, possibly indicating a potential future bid for a modern Sino-Russian world order. While the U.S.-Australia nuclear-powered submarines deal bolsters defensive military posture in the region, such a potential situation would certainly test the Quad 2.0 and likely force India to choose between Russia or the West.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the AUKUS partnership will likely provide Australia with some stability against Beijing’s threats of economic retaliation as well as ushering in a new strategic era of post- Global War on Terrorism bilateral cooperation. In addition, this will strengthen the Quad 2.0 and help spearhead its potential for the next round of development successes against possible threats on the horizon from India’s dual influences from Russia and the U.S. This is why it is ultimately better positioned for success than its predecessor as it forges ahead on shared interests of deterring China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific with the group’s internal influence and cooperation that includes several areas of strategic interest. Finally, Australia’s shift to nuclear-powered submarine deal with the U.S. over a previous agreement for diesel submarines from France signifies Australia’s acknowledgement of the growing strategic value of the Indo-Pacific, the Chinese threat, and may allow for increased U.S. influence through the deal.

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