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Burma and China’s Strategy Beyond the Western Pacific: Assessing Instability and Opportunity

September 21, 2020 by Fulcrum Global Leave a Comment

Myanmar State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Presidential Palace in Naypyitaw on 18 January 2020. Source: Reuters

By Wayland Blue – Contributor

After many years the Chinese and Burmese relationship has reversed itself from displaying limited importance to one that has great strategic value in this current period of great power competition between the United States (U.S.) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a result, the Indo-Pacific region has risen to prominence for U.S. foreign policy and national security officials as they now emphasize more heavily on countering China’s expansionism in the South China Sea region. The relationship between the U.S. and China has become aggressively competitive and that is why immediate focus on the South China Sea is crucial for US and allied security interests. However, the Chinese government is increasing its assertiveness along several other lines of efforts that often receive far less attention.

A striking example that recently captured wider attention has been long-standing tensions between China and India over contested portions of their shared Himalayan border territories. However, there are other more long-term examples that come to mind. For example, the construction of port facilities throughout the Indian Ocean reveals the potential for strategic competition rather than co-prosperity. This is often referred to as being the “String of Pearls” strategy. This geopolitical theory involves China’s construction of a land and maritime network of infrastructures that encircles India’s realm of influence.

On the opposite side of mainland Southeast Asia, the Chinese government has a significant interest in the Indian Ocean and has grown by increasing its military footprint in the region. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, we have seen the Chinese Navy streamline its activity in the Eastern Indian Ocean. This behavior has provoked India which considers the area its traditional sphere of influence.

Source: Asia Times

China’s interests in the Indian Ocean are long-standing and historically revolve around the strategy of diversifying supply lines, to increase its domestic energy security by bypassing the Strait of Malacca. The linchpin in its strategy is Burma which provides China’s only overland route to the Indian Ocean. Burma is officially known as Myanmar outside of the U.S. government and it is strategically located between India, China, and the rest of Southeast Asia. The country’s strategic location has also become a critical component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as well.

Meanwhile, Burma has received limited strategic attention from western governments and has a highly negative international image due to its history of isolation, 70 plus years of internal conflicts, and a continually poor human rights record. Engagement with Burma and its recently civilianized government after decades of military rule was a cornerstone of the Obama Administration’s Pivot to the Pacific. However, the U.S. and other western governments have been frustrated by limited progress and continued human rights abuses. The Rohingya crisis of 2017 drew international condemnation, genocide charges, and a ruling against Burma by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that triggered renewed U.S. sanctions and brought major difficulties for further engagement. Western pressure and escalating internal conflicts in Burma created an environment conducive to China’s interests.

China’s Key Interests In Burma

Since the Cold War period, the PRC has long recognized Burma as an occupier of strategic geography that can help support their national interests. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) never directly threatened the Burmese government despite the fear and trust issues between the two nations. Although, the CCP did provide support to the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) who were engaged in an insurgent conflict in the northern region near the Chinese border. China’s lack of intervention in Burma was, paradoxically, to support its strategic and ideological interests by avoiding western, especially US attention at a time when China felt itself being encircled in the wake of the Korean war and the beginning of the Vietnam Conflict. Burma, as an early member of the non-aligned movement, served as a vital channel to the outside world as the U.S. presence began expanding elsewhere in Asia at the time.

As China’s government became less ideological and more focused on internal development and economic growth, the focus on Burma was renewed. Burma was seen as a source of natural resources and an alternative route to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East to diversify China’s trade and energy supply lines, by bypassing the Strait of Malacca. Additionally, trade between China’s Southwestern Yunnan Province and northern Burma was crucial for regional development in China.

Troops order a crowd 26 August 1988 in downtown Rangoon (Yangon) to disperse in front of sule pagoda sealed off by barbed wires. Hundreds of thousand people gathered two kilometers away to demand democracy and the end of the 26 years old authoritarian regime. 8888 Uprising was a national uprising demanding democracy that took place on 08 August 1988 in Burma (now Myanmar). It ended on 18 September 1988, after a bloody military coup. Because of the uprisings, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was formed. The military killed thousands of civilians, including students and Buddhist monks. During the crisis, Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as a national icon. Source: TOMMASO VILLANI/AFP/Getty Images)

Burma received significant international pressure and condemnation in the wake of Burma’s 1988 uprising that was characterized by widespread pro-democracy protests against the long-standing military dictatorship and followed by brutal crackdowns. At the same time, China stepped up its engagement by increasing trade and ceasing support to the BCP which subsequently fragmented into several smaller groups. In the following years, China increased its influence and access as Burma gradually de-isolated.

China’s key interests in Burma have evolved and solidified to include (1) Security and trade along the shared border, (2) access to natural resources, and (3) access to the Indian Ocean via ports on the northwest coast of Burma to increase trade and energy security and potentially facilitate force projection.

These key interests are centered in the northern Shan, Kachin, and Rakhine states, which are areas that are chronically unstable and are presently experiencing escalated conflicts. The long-running conflict is predominantly between the central government and several ethnic armed organizations (EAO) ideologically motivated by a desire for greater autonomy, but also often engaged in illicit activities, most notably narcotics trafficking. Narcotics trafficking and movements of refugees displaced by the conflict also create regional security challenges that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Burma is a member, as well as the wider international community, have been incapable of confronting. However, the instability opens opportunities that the Chinese government has seized on.

China Leveraging Instability to Gain Strategic Advantage

The Chinese government has exploited Burma’s negative image with western nations to position itself as the country’s most important ally and primary supporter in the international community. China is also Burma’s primary trade partner and source of foreign direct investment as well as its biggest arms supplier. China’s involvement in Myanmar has caused suspicion on the part of the Burmese government, as well as domestic protest, especially in the cause of the China-backed Myitsone dam hydroelectric project in Kachin State. Nevertheless, Burma has few competitive options for investment in its domestic development.

A major factor underpinning the Burmese government’s mistrust is China’s long-standing pattern of dual engagement with both the central government and hostile non-state actors. This pattern began with the CCP’s support of the BCP and now continues with the Chinese government’s high-level engagements and alleged arms sales to the most powerful EAO, the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The UWSA is the largest descendent organization of the BCP which collapsed in the late 1980s after China withdrew support and increased economic engagement with the central government.

Following the 1988 uprising and collapse of the BCP, the central government rushed to conclude ceasefire agreements with several EAOs, including the UWSA on the condition that EAOs would be permitted economic free reign in their territories, which also includes narcotics trafficking. China also maintained relations with the UWSA and other EAOs along its border which control critical trade gates to Yunnan province and which received arms and training from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The system of ambiguously legal and illicit economic activity involving the Burmese military, EAOs, and foreign (often Chinese) business interests that evolved during the ceasefire period is commonly referred to as ceasefire capitalism. Ceasefire capitalism meant a reduction in open conflict but many local grievances went unaddressed that resulted in an escalation of the conflict. This occurred while the military dictatorship stepped aside and allowed civilianization of the government in 2010.

Source: Al Jazeera

Key actors in the current conflict include the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDA), and the Arakan Army (AA). These four EAOs are in coordination with overlapping objectives for greater territorial autonomy and are collectively referred to as the Brotherhood Alliance. The AA, which received initial training and continues to be logistically supported by other Brotherhood Alliance members are the newest and most ambitious having expanded the conflict from Shan and Kachin states to Chin and Rakhine states. At present, the conflict with the AA that is occurring in the same area as the Rohingya crisis and challenging repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh is the most serious.

The UWSA has maintained its ceasefire agreement with the central government and controls its own de facto autonomous territory. However, it lends both ideological as well as material support to Brotherhood Alliance members. China has capitalized on its ongoing relationship with the UWSA to position itself as the primary peace broker in northern Myanmar between EAOs and the central government. Reducing conflict in the area is also critical for securing BRI projects and trade.

China’s diplomatic efforts have had some limited success in terms of facilitating continued negotiations but have also indirectly fueled the conflict by legitimizing several EAOs in support of the AA, which is active near China’s main deep-water port development project at Kyaukpyu, Rakhine State. The AA has signaled its interest in maintaining good relations with China, as well as demonstrating preferential treatment by threatening India-backed investment projects.

Conclusion

A combination photo of Chinese President Xi Jinping (L), US President Donald Trump (C), and Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. Source: Asia Times

China arguably prioritizes its strategic interests above Burma’s internal security or political reform. China’s leveraging of Burma’s negative international image and isolated position have translated to strong ties with the Burmese government. However, China’s direct support to the UWSA and relations with other EAOs indicate a complex approach to securing its key objectives in Burma. It is likely the case that continued conflict in the region is politically expedient for the Chinese government. Continued instability and the Burmese government’s heavy-handed approach maintains international pressure allowing China preferential access while at the same time allowing China to fulfill its objectives in contested areas by leveraging relationships with EAOs.

The situation in Burma poses a complex challenge for the U.S. in strategic competition with China for two reasons. First, Burma is critical geography for strategic competition and power projection in the Indian Ocean that the Chinese government has been able to engage with minimal opposition and may likely use to expand its military assertiveness in the region. Second, Burma’s poor human rights record, independent military, and negative international image make traditional security cooperation politically infeasible given the diplomatic and international law issues that surround it. Attempting to mitigate the negative effects of China’s strategic objectives in the region will require a difficult balance between engaging and supporting the Burmese government without enabling its worst behavior.

_______________________________________________________ 

Wayland Blue volunteers as a researcher with Shade Tree Foundation, a Thai NGO focused on aid and development in the Burmese migrant and refugee community. He also serves as a reservist with III MEF. He previously served as an active duty Marine officer in I and III MEF holding billets including platoon commander, company commander, and Battalion Logistics Officer, and was deployed to Afghanistan in 2014 supporting retrograde operations from RC-SW. He holds a BA in Political Science from UC Berkeley and an MA in International Relations and Conflict Resolution from American Military University (AMU), which is part of the American Public University System (APUS). He can be reached at waylandblue@shadetreethailand.org

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Filed Under: Featured Articles & Essays, Wayland Blue Tagged With: armed ethnic groups, Belt and Road Initiative, Burma, China, China and India tensions, EAOs, Indo Pacific, Indochina, Myanmar, PLA, PRC, String of Pearls, United States, US-China competition

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