By Sam Kessler – Chief and Managing Editor
This is Part 1 of a new series by the author called:
“The Big Picture of the Russia-Ukraine War Series”
The war in Ukraine is a catalyst breeding ground for several geopolitical and national security issues that have been looming in the background for several years. At this point in time there are recent efforts to de-escalate the war that include a recent ceasefire in the Black Sea, which is also an attempt to reopen trade and commercial sea routes in that region. A Trump White House statement said, “The United States and Russia have agreed to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea.” However, it is still dependent on whether the Russians are fully committed to enacting this agreement as they are still seeking to be admitted back into the SWIFT international banking system after being kicked out of it when the war began in 2022.
Another de-escalation attempt is the recent temporary ceasefire arrangement dealing with strikes on energy infrastructures and the current negotiations for implementing a 30-day truce. All of this indicates that conflict resolution of the war is gradually being tested to see how all the various players react and are committed to the idea prior to a potential escalation for a final settlement. What this entails remains in question as well as the issue of security guarantees and the goal of creating a lasting peace deal. However, this offers a little time to look at the good, the bad, and the ugly of the current situation dynamics, as well as the threat scenarios that need to be considered and gamed out when assessing the big picture realities of several players that have stakes in the outcomes of this war.
Assessing Russia’s Long Term Strategic Reality as a Result of the War

For example, while many in the Western world tend to spend more time focusing on the Ukrainians ability to be resilient against Russian forces throughout the last three years, it would also be helpful to assess the Russians ability to withstand Ukrainian efforts too. After all, the Russians are dealing with a Ukrainian force that has received a significant amount of military and intelligence training, support, and resources that have been transferred to them by the United States and its NATO allies for at least a decade. However, three years of fighting a war at the level it is being fought has been bleeding Moscow dry of critical military resources, assets, and power projection capabilities that can take years, at best, to rebuild and recover in their current capacity.
In the short term, this would seem like a good thing for the warrior proponents that support both Ukrainian sovereignty and their continued fighting with the Russian Federation. However, a weakened Russia in the long term creates an emboldened China and makes it next to impossible to rebalance the international security structure that has been shared by the U.S., China, and Russia (Triangle Balance of Power) since the end of World War Two. Since the current negotiations are leading towards a potential truce, there are certain relevant factors to be considered for either this or a lasting peace agreement.
![Servicemen of the 39th Separate Coastal Defence Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces fire a 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer towards Russian troops at a front line, in the Kherson region, Ukraine on March 23, 2025 [Ivan Antypenko/Reuters]](https://i0.wp.com/fulcrumglobal.us/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2025-03-24T173101Z_2057639073_RC23JDAMMD1S_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-KHERSON-FRONTLINE-1742864852.jpg.webp?resize=466%2C310&ssl=1)
The Russian Federation may currently have enough regional strength to project power in its sphere influence. However, they are in a position where they will need to assess how long that will last if they choose not to agree to a lasting peace with the Ukraine, U.S., and NATO at the bargaining table. It will also determine how they weigh the future conditions of their friendly “no limits” relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which is complicated and limits the future sovereignty of the Russian Federation. In other words, there will be strengths and weaknesses that the Russians will have to consider when determining the future fate of their own strategic reality.
The War is Turning the Russian Economy Into a Vassal State of China
Economic warfare is a part of Beijing’s arsenal and non-kinetic methods that are aimed at luring weakened nations under their umbrella and forcing them to be highly dependent on their structures and systems for unforeseeable time periods. For lack of a better word, Russia is on the path of becoming a vassal state of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). After all, Beijing is buying Russian oil, gas, and raw materials at bargain basement prices. In addition, they are keeping the Russian economy afloat, but on Beijing’s terms. The longer the war in Ukraine continues, the more that Russia under Vladimir Putin becomes more reliant on China for trade, technology, and financial access. In all essence, Russia is on a full-scale path to becoming a subordinate to Beijing’s economic dominance and the ramifications would directly impact the power roles within the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The change in roles and influences would directly affect both the economic and security decisions into China’s favor, thus further marginalizing future Russian leadership.
Weakening the Russian Military as a Geopolitical Counterweight to China
The Ukrainian war is causing the Russians to burn through a lot of their best military hardware and assets that takes years to cultivate, build-up, and train. The Russian government in the Post-Cold War era managed to preserve their reputation for creating high-quality military hardware and assets, however, their production and manufacturing capabilities are no longer like those of the Soviet era or of the mass scale like that of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Put this in consideration when we look at what exactly is being chewed up on a daily basis as the war continues each day. The loss rates for Moscow are unsustainable for their high-end military hardware, elite forces, and strategic reserves that are being used in this theatre of war.
In addition, it is projected that if the war were to end tomorrow, it would take the Russians years, if not decades, to rebuild their former military strength in their current manufacturing capacity. If this trend continues to escalate, we will likely witness a long-term scenario where Russia will be unable to serve as a geopolitical counterweight to China. The end result would be that China ends up being the dominant force in Eurasia and further marginalizing Russian sovereignty and influence in the region. This brings into question on how this will impact governments in the Eurasian region as well as in Europe, Middle East, Asia, Africa, and in the Americas.
Russia is Distracted and Losing its Leverage in Central Asia
Both Moscow and Beijing have strategic and historical interests in Central Asia as China has a longtime relationship with the Silk Road and Russia with its former Soviet Republics. In addition, Russia before the war had held primary power in the former Soviet Republics in this region. However, the Russian’s preoccupation on the Ukrainian war has made it easier for China to move in gradually and uncontested. For example, there have been indicators that Beijing has been expanding their economic grip over Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. This means that the Silk Road is once again becoming more dominated by China rather than the Russians, which means that Beijing is quietly taking control of key energy and infrastructure projects that once were under Moscow’s domain.

Increased Russian Dependence on Chinese Technology
Since 2014, the Russian government has been shifting its technological dependence to the east as a result of long-term Western sanctions. This reached a pivotal point when the Ukraine war began in 2022 as Moscow now depends on critical technologies and access to financial systems via their forced pivot to China. Rather than having access to the West, the Russians now rely on China for semiconductors, banking networks, and industrial components to keep the country staying afloat and preserving their war effort. Beijing is not doing this out of charity nor sympathy. In pure realist form, the Chinese have dictated their terms as well as taking advantage of the opportunity to embed their own technology into Russia’s infrastructure. This ensures that there will be a long-term Russian dependence on Chinese supply chains, and it also entails that their systems may be susceptible to being compromised if Moscow’s relationship with Beijing eventually sours.
Conclusion
For at least a decade it has been estimated by a few analysts that Russia has been on the path to becoming a junior player in its partnership and good neighbor agreements with Beijing. Although this was once considered an unthinkable reality at one point, it’s now becoming more realistic each day the war continues as it weakens Russia while strengthening China’s position. If this is the case, then it will be significantly harder for Moscow to be able to repair its fractured relationships with the U.S. and its European (NATO) allies. While this is the strategic reality that Moscow has to ponder for its immediate and long-term trends, it is also the same for the U.S. and its allies when considering what a potential peace agreement would look like and the feasibility in repairing relations with Russia at some point. After all, it will directly affect the state of the U.S.-China-Russia triangle balance of power structure and the future of the geopolitical chessboard that is the new international system.
In addition, the Russians are in a situation where they have to choose which is more beneficial to them: a multi-vector foreign policy that gives them more freedom; independence; a potential return to normal diplomatic relations; Western access; and possible re-acceptance, or to be in a deep alignment with the Chinese to challenge the U.S.-led international order. Russian foreign policy circles are mixed on this issue despite the current trend leading toward supporting a confrontational policy against the United State with China and Iran. The current scenario indicates that the bread has been buttered while the world of the real also reminds us that not everything is as they seem. After all, the current formal diplomatic negotiations have yet to offer an off-ramp for Putin’s Russia to save face in a potential lasting peace deal, which perhaps indicates that a quieter and informal form of diplomacy would work better for the parties involved.

If Moscow is indeed looking for an opportunity to change the scenario dealing with their long-term strategic reality dilemmas, then chances are that the manner in which the Ukrainian war ends will be the catalyst for that future outcome’s latest trends and patterns. After all, a prolonged war by mainly European nations would not be realistic either, particularly since they lack capacity, capability, and resolve to be able to sustain a long-drawn-out conflict with Russia, by themselves, if current efforts to reaching a lasting peace deal were to potentially fail. Lastly, it is important to note that a potential peace agreement will very likely be more than just about resolving the war between Russia and Ukraine as it will also be about setting the stage for the international security environment going forward. This is why it is essential to look at how the war is benefitting China while hurting Russia in the long term, while also considering what that entails for the U.S. and its European (NATO) allies in the new strategic reality.
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Sam Kessler is a writer, analyst, and consultant with a national security, global security, geopolitics, and business/finance background. He is also a Geopolitical Advisor for North Star Support Group and a contributor to other publications and outlets on related topics and issues. Sam has both an M.A. in National Security and Intelligence Analysis and an M.A. in Intelligence Operations (Strategic Intelligence) from American Military University (AMU), which is part of the American Public University System (APUS) and holds a B.A. in International Studies from Bradley University with an Economics minor. Sam can be contacted via his website/blog at www.samkessler.com and his LinkedIn page.
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