The Multi-Polar Role of Russia’s Primakov Doctrine and the Certainty of a Chinese-Russian Strategic Alliance

By Sam Kessler – Chief and Managing Editor ; SDSS President

The new international system is one that has been built on trends, patterns, and indicators that have been in the making for several years. Trends are typically built on catalyst events and scenarios that cascade into a wide variety of situations and new norms that tend to result into both expected and unexpected circumstances. The conditions of the new international system that is currently transpiring in this era of rising multi-polarism have been projected for well-over a decade now. As a result, time has caught up over the years as cataclysmic events have led to what has become the new national and global strategic reality, which greatly impacts the stability of the liberal international economic world order that has been in place since the end of the Second World War.

Such recent catalysts that come to mind are the following:

• The Russian annexation of Crimea and its supported insurrection in the Donbas region of Ukraine resulting into ongoing and increasing tensions between the U.S. (its NATO/EU allies) and Russia.
• The US-China trade war dispute.
• The CoVid-19 pandemic shutting down and causing havoc to global and national political, social, health, economic, and supply chain systems.
• The U.S. disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan.
• Rising U.S. and international hyper-politicization, debt, and inflation impacting an increase in domestic and civil unrest worldwide.
• The increasing reports of adversarial espionage and subversive activities on mainland U.S. and assets abroad.
• The growing instability in the Middle East regarding Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
• The Russian-Ukrainian war and increasing threat for a full-fledged war between the U.S. and its European allies with Russia.
• The increase in great power strategic positioning in the Indo-Pacific in response to the rising threat of Chinese expansionism.
• The rising tensions over both the South China Sea and a potential Chinese CCP invasion of Taiwan and U.S involvement in its protection.
• The closer relationship between China and Russia as well as other members that make up the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Transition from a Unipolar to a Multi-polar System

The world of 2008 is significantly different from 2022 and has completely transformed from a Unipolar international system to becoming a multi-polar opposite where players from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.) aligned nations (including potential members like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, and Argentina) have further evolved into becoming consolidated near-peer competitors and adversaries of U.S. preponderance in a world where the risk of wars for resources and power projection have streamlined immensely. More importantly, tensions between the United States, China, and Russia continued to escalate over the years and has resulted into three decades of closer and friendlier relations between Beijing and Moscow. This signifies the likeliness of a strategic formalized alliance by China and Russia against the United States and its allies.

The New Strategic Reality is the Return of Multi-polarism and Great Power Competition

There have been warning signs for several years regarding the predicted and forecasted evolution of the new strategic reality regarding the rise of multi-polarism and great power competition. For example, C. Thomas Fingar and other experts in the national security and intelligence communities warned U.S. policymakers in the 2008 volume of the National Intelligence Council’s report called, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World” that specifically stated the following:

“Historically, emerging multi-polar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones. Despite the recent financial volatility—which could end up accelerating many ongoing trends—we do not believe that we are headed toward a complete breakdown of the international system, as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier phase of globalization came to a halt. However, the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks. Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve around trade, investments, and technological innovation and acquisition, but we cannot rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries.

This is a story with no clear outcome, as illustrated by a series of vignettes we use to map out divergent futures. Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength—even in the military realm—will decline and US leverage will become more constrained. At the same time, the extent to which other actors—both state and nonstate—will be willing or able to shoulder increased burdens is unclear. Policymakers and publics will have to cope with a growing demand for multilateral cooperation when the international system will be stressed by the incomplete transition from the old to a still-forming new order.” (Global Trends 2025, 2008).

The war between Russia and Ukraine as well as tensions over China and Taiwan are simply part of a much bigger picture and long-term problem that is being illustrated in the current evolution of the international system. This dilemma can be traced back to at least the formation of what is known as the U.S., China, and Russia triangle balance of power system that was cultivated by the United States and People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1970s via the leadership of President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. This trilateral balance of power system aided the West in its ultimate efforts to win the Cold War.

After all, China no longer had friendly relations with the Soviet Union that had soured by the 1960s. As a result, the United States enabled the PRC’s growth by giving it diplomatic recognition and establishing the roots of what would eventually become known as a historical mega trade and manufacturing relationship. It eventually helped Beijing become a thriving economic superpower that would end up rivaling Washington and other leading world players. This era began after the Cold War had ended and the agreed entry of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In addition, it also ushered in the latest round of globalization and streamlined it to a level the international system had never experienced before. As a result, this created catalysts that were predictable in terms of possible long-term impacts, although it may not have been fully recognized or accepted at the time of implementation.

Assuming the U.S., China, and Russia Triangle Would Always be in America’s Favor

It’s important to note that U.S. policymakers had assumed that it could prevent a future Sino-Russian relationship from occurring because of Beijing’s strong desire to develop and improve its economic and social living conditions for its own people. This approach was incorporated by U.S. policymakers while also assuming that it would lead to ending the dictatorial, ideological, and totalitarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system. In other words, the grand assumption by the U.S. was that a stronger and more open Chinese economy would lead to greater freedom, openness, and democracy in China. However, fifty years later the CCP remains intact and in full control of the PRC with even stricter controls on its citizens. In addition, there continue to be excessive references to communism and socialism with Chinese characteristics outlined in CCP rhetoric, as well as in President Xi Jinping’s speech at the recently held 20^th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

Moreover, it was a major coup and victory by American policymakers that prevented the formation of a Sino-Russian alliance against the U.S. and its allies during the Cold War. However, the situation changed immediately after the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 that led to a much weaker Russia and a huge power vacuum in the international system began to develop. At the time it led to the role of the United States as the sole superpower in the world and the assumed endless enhancement of American preponderance in the international system. In fact, this became America’s grand strategy out of the ashes of the Second World War and continued after the demise of the Soviet empire. Globalization became the new game and a key priority for Washington’s new role in the international system during the end of the 20^th century and into the new millennium.

Christopher Layne mentioned in his 1997 paper, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing, America’s Future Grand Strategy” that:

“The key elements of this strategy are creation and maintenance of a U.S.-led world order based on preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power, and on American values; maximization of U.S. control over the international system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers in Europe and East Asia; and maintenance of economic interdependence as a vital U.S. security interest. The logic of the strategy is that interdependence is the paramount interest the strategy promotes; instability is the threat to interdependence; and extended deterrence is the means by which the strategy deals with this threat.” (International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1997).

However, it is important to note that countries like China and Russia had realized that it was essential for them to play out a long game to deal with the U.S. as the preeminent superpower in the liberal international rules-based order that had been established after World War Two. The result is a new international system and strategic reality that is greatly challenging the established structure with the re-emergence of multi-polarism becoming the new norm. This also raises important questions regarding longstanding values, norms, alliances, and relationships in the realm of geopolitics and great power competition in the 21^st century.

Brzezinski’s Grand Prediction of China and Russia Forming a Strategic Alliance

Zbigniew Brzezinski was not only one of America’s leading strategic thinkers in the 20^th century but was also considered having been a legendary U.S. national security and foreign policy advisor as well. The previous year before he died in 2017, Brzezinski had begun sounding the alarm to the national security and foreign policy communities by expressing his grave concern regarding the closer relations between Moscow and Beijing. In fact, he is quoted as having warned that:

“The most dangerous scenario would be that a grand coalition of China and Russia…united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. This coalition would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower.”

In other words, Brzezinski implied that Moscow would likely be the junior partner while Beijing served as the senior partner in the arrangement. For several decades this idea was considered unrealistic and unbelievable throughout the U.S. foreign policy and national security communities as the strategic reality hardly shifted paradigms in a fluid and unpredictable nature. As a result, it has become apparent that predictability has become a vulnerability of sorts within the new strategic reality regarding an international system that has become overly reliant on the concept of global interdependence. In addition, the rise of multi-polarism, near-peer competition, increasingly unified influence of BRICS aligned nations (as well as new and potential membership), compromised global supply chains, and the catalysts creating new norms is bringing into question the concepts of old alliance structures, new relationships, new beginnings, and new but very old scenarios.

The New International System and its Components

The new international system is one that is quickly evolving into a strategic multi-polar reality for the United States and its allies. This also includes its competitors and near-peer adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, it is not always easy to assess existing positions of power projection within a system that is constantly changing and possessing more adversaries with capabilities to wage, win, and prolong wars without having to become a major traditional power player. With that said, great power competition is always discussed in the traditional format that meets the definition within the old liberal international rules-based order.

Great power politics and realism in international relations is back with a vengeance. It never really left, but the international system has been ineffective in tackling it as it has been making a stark comeback in a very quick fashion these past few years. The concern is that current generations of practitioners may not be in great shape for dealing with the new strategic multi-polar reality where realism and realpolitik in international relations is once again the currency of diplomacy as well as strategic and operational thinking in the national security, defense, and intelligence realms. In addition, the current global open-source intelligence (OSINT) arena is heavily thick in the shroud of a “fog of war” type of environment, where elements of narrative warfare such as subversive, disinformation and misinformation operations are proven very effective in deception and creating cognitively compromised practitioners and civilian populations worldwide. When coupled with increasingly pedantic analysis to meet certain socio-political agendas, rigorous analysis is much compromised.

Dealing with these long-term situational scenarios will require mindsets that are lean, savvy, resourceful, multi-disciplinary, strong minded, creative, adaptive, cunning, proactive, volunteer-driven, and being results oriented. In addition, this new strategic reality will also require a great deal of courage, faith, and conviction-oriented mindsets to deal with these issues with great skill, patience, haste, determination, humbleness, and wisdom. These will be required to maneuver the current situational dilemma and going forward to dealing with future cascading issues, scenarios, and events. Therefore, having the right mindset is essential for the new strategic reality era that is transpiring in real time.

After all, the U.S. has enjoyed being the preeminent power in the international system for the last three decades since the Cold War ended. It has also enjoyed a relatively peaceful and prosperous era both domestically and abroad, like other countries during this time. However, this level of comfort can and has generated both weaknesses and severe vulnerabilities within societal structures, spheres of influence, and its systems that adversaries and allies have studied and used to their strategic advantages throughout the decades. This has been an ongoing problem that has continued for several years and is catching up very quickly within an abundance of areas, issues , and vulnerabilities in the physical, cognitive, and digital realm.

Long-term Strategic Maneuvering Toward a Multi-polar World by China and Russia

The bi-polar system of the Cold War era evolved after the Soviet Union’s demise into a heightened and stimulated version of globalization that helped raise countries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) out of poverty and into their own upward mobilities. During great wealth accumulation, this provided the Chinese regime with opportunities to adapt and get creative at strengthening themselves in the long term via leverage building as well as developing new capabilities. Prime examples of this can be seen through the execution of soft power projection and the utilization of espionage, subversive and ideological influence operations by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Unrestricted Warfare, Three Warfares Strategies, 36 Strategems, Weaponized Narratives, and Hybrid Warfare

Other than soft power projection, weaponized narratives, and subversion, it can also be exhibited via the subtle implementation of asymmetrical (unconventional) warfare tactics that are commonly utilized against a superior conventional force (politically, economically, socially, and militarily). These tactics can greatly impact all spheres of influence within a society during both times of peace and war. As a result, this approach enabled the Chinese regime’s muscle accumulation over the years while going mostly unopposed by the U.S. and its allies via the adoption of policies and concepts that stem from unrestricted warfare doctrine, “Three Warfares” strategies, 36 Stratagems, and other elements of asymmetrical and cognitive warfare capabilities.

In addition, it is important to note that the Russian Federation also adapted their own version of asymmetrical warfare shortly after the disintegration of the former Soviet Empire in 1991. Hybrid warfare became the Russians key strategy for survival and relevance in the beginning of a new international system that their planners thought would eventually become multi-polar in time. Russian Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, often known as the great implementer of Russian hybrid warfare from a military perspective, had crafted what is known as the Gerasimov doctrine, otherwise known as the “whole-of-government concept that fuses hard and soft power across many domains and transcends boundaries between peace and wartime.”

The Primakov Doctrine

However, Russian hybrid warfare can be best described as being the full creation of legendary foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, who forged what is known as the Primakov doctrine shortly after the disintegration of the former Soviet empire. This is the reason why Russian hybrid warfare exists today as it takes the position that a unipolar world dominated by the United States is considered unacceptable by Russia and establishes the following Russian foreign policy principles that are:

• Russia would strive toward a multi-polar world managed by a collection of major powers that can serve as a counterbalance to U.S. unilateral power.
• Russia would insist on its primacy in the post-Soviet space and lead integration in that region.
• Russia would oppose NATO expansion.

With that said, Moscow’s utilization of hybrid warfare suggests a balance of hard and soft power elements to achieve its goals and objectives with risk management constantly at the forefront of implementation. Although, the poorly executed war in Ukraine seems to have been poorly managed in terms of overall risk management for the Russians. However, the Primakov doctrine has not been completely reckless in its strategy as it was designed to fuse elements of hard and soft power with the full utilization of the Russian military as well as their foreign service and use of proxies. The result is a modern China and Russia that have been positioning themselves for several years through the utilization of asymmetrical and cognitive warfare tactics that enable them to challenge U.S. preponderance more adequately within an increasingly multi-polar international system filled with near-peer competitors and adversaries.

Rebuilding the Chinese-Russian Relationship After the Cold War

The repairing of the Chinese and Russian relationship has been evolving gradually for the past three decades since the Soviet Union’s demise. It has been a series of good neighbor agreements that are periodically updated along with other Chinese-Russian agreements that pertain to: agriculture; cybersecurity; regional defense agreements, exercises, and collaboration; energy purchases and investments; infrastructure deals; as well as economic and military cooperation and aid. The impact of the war in Ukraine has illustrated the evolution of a fruitful and stronger relationship between these two ancient neighbors. The PRC continues to show signs of supporting Russia during this war, whether it is at the United Nations as well as providing economic, military, and technological support for keeping their operations and societal systems intact.

In addition, the rising power of China collaborating with resource rich Russia would prove to be lucrative if the two power’s standing relationship remain united and in sync in the long-term without any relationship hiccups. After all, the relationship and partnership did receive an update during a meeting just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine where Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping declared a “no limits partnership”. This would mean greater military coordination and collaboration between the two authoritarian powers that have similar grievances with the West and the U.S. In addition, Moscow has supported Beijing’s sentiments regarding a potential invasion of Taiwan as well. As a result, this enables a potential integrated and coordinated outcome of multiple supported conflicts worldwide that are likely to occur in at least Europe and the Asian-Indo-Pacific regions.

Prolonging the Russian and Ukrainian War Creates New Opportunities, Knowledge, and Power Vacuums

The war in Ukraine is teaching the international community about the continued evolution of 21^st century conventional and unconventional warfare. Also, it is evolving into new and updated tactics in the realm of military operations, strategy, diplomacy, intelligence, national security, energy security, economic statecraft, drone warfare, nuclear weapons strategy, etc.  It is also teaching all sides on how the West and the East may be prepared to respond in various fighting, combat, threat, and tactical scenarios, especially regarding the rules of siege warfare. Everyone is paying attention, especially the People’s Republic of China who continue to show greater determination to re-unify Taiwan with the PRC now that Xi Jinping has a third term in power and placing his proteges and loyalists at the seats of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) politburo. During the recent 20^th Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress, Xi had made the bold statement that “China will never renounce the right to use force but will strive for a peaceful resolution.”

The Questionable Shelf Life of a Chinese-Russian Strategic Alliance

China and Russia are ancient neighbors who lack a long-term historical consistency of trusting each other. This is essential to understand for those that are only focusing on this aspect of a relationship between Beijing and Moscow. Fractured alliances in a world where realism and realpolitik are predominant can survive until they’re no longer needed nor attractive to a partner. A primary example of this would be the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia prior to World War 2. This agreement stated that both nations would agree to divide Eastern Europe while agreeing to not take military action against each other for the next 10 years. This non-aggression pact was broken within two years of it being signed when Nazi Germany had launched a three million troop invasion of the Soviet Union known as Operation Barbarosa. Ironically, the Soviet Union ended up switching to the allies side as a result of this betrayal and collaborated with the allied alliance led by the U.S. and Great Britain.

Examples like the German breaking of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are essential to understand and put into context when examining both the likeliness and shelf life of a Chinese-Russian strategic alliance. After all, the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea resulted into Western sanctions and the closer and streamlined relationship building between Moscow and Beijing. This is somewhat like what happened in the 1970s reversal of the U.S., Russia, and China Triangle when the PRC under Mao Zedong abandoned prospects for a return to friendly relations with Moscow to establish deeper economic ties with Washington and the West. A similar scenario with 21^st century characteristics can be easily noticeable here as well between the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation in this new strategic reality.

Both Moscow and Beijing understand the potential for history to repeat itself. However, it is likely considered in the various good neighbor and partnership agreements that keep getting updated since the initial round that took place in the 1996 Strategic Partnership Coordination Agreement signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin. This initial agreement between the Chinese and Russian governments began the process of “developing a strategic partnership of equality, mutual confidence, and mutual coordination for the 21st century”. It also was followed by the 1997 Sino-Russian commitment to fostering and promoting a new international policy based on multipolarity as a strategy for countering US unilateral dominance in the post-Cold War era.

China is Not Likely to End its Strategic Relationship with Russia in this Current Reality

A possible breakup in Chinese-Russian relations would happen if Beijing found it beneficial to end it suddenly and temporarily forego an invasion of Taiwan. However, this may also indicate that the international system has reached a level of multi-polarity that would be extremely difficult to reverse, as well as being tempting for Beijing to reconsider its relationship with Moscow. The Russian Far East (Siberia) would very likely be an attractive target if the PRC were to consider this option. After all, it is vast in territory and sparsely populated of Russians while migration of Chinese migrants is increasing.

In addition, the Russian Far East is also lightly defended and heavily rich in resources and raw materials such as oil, metals, timber, fish, natural gas, wood, diamonds, iron ore, coal, gold, silver, lead, and zinc. This would be lucrative for the PRC if they think the Russian Federation is too weak and compromised with a potential kinetic war with U.S. and NATO. However, it’s not likely to occur at this juncture given the level of support and rhetoric both sides have given to each other regarding Ukraine and Taiwan. Also, both sides need each other as well for different purposes in the sphere of great power competition with the U.S. and the West. China and Russia will also likely need each other while redefining their own power projection and leveraging capabilities during the return of multi-polarism in the new international system.

Russia is Not Likely to End its Strategic Relationship with China in this Current Reality

While some experts may still doubt the potential of a strategic alliance occurring between Beijing and Moscow it is essential to assess the options that Russia may have if certain scenarios were to change abruptly. In other words, it raises an interesting question on if Russia can be weaned off its streamlined pivot to Asia (China) that began because of the 2014 Crimean annexation. This led to the beginning of a string of sanctions and anti-Russian sentiments in the West that were tied to it. In the current reality, it is very unlikely to witness Moscow relinquishing its eastward Asian pivot. After all, the international system is more multi-polar now than it was a decade ago with elements of Beijing’s international leadership and policies pertaining to the increasing influence of the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that are now more transparent and obvious.

In fact, Vladimir Putin during a September 2022 speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, mentioned that the current trajectory of the international system is to see Asia as the center of global growth. Putin is quoted as having said, “Irreversible and even tectonic changes have taken place throughout international relations. The role of dynamic, promising countries and regions of the world, primarily the Asia-Pacific region, has significantly increased.” In addition, Moscow’s relations with NATO and E.U. member states are in much worse shape because of the Ukrainian war. The chances of Moscow repairing relations with the E.U. soon are very unlikely since the European Parliament recently declared Russia to be a state sponsor of terrorism because of the tactics and methods the Russian military has utilized in the Ukrainian war.

In addition, China’s long term demographics problem may potentially generate a lucrative opportunity down the road for Russia’s eastward Asian pivot in terms of geopolitical and economic maneuvering in that region. The low fertility rates caused by the one-child policy has proven to be detrimental in the long term for the PRC’s ability to adequately replace their aging populations in the upcoming decades. Birthrates continue to decline in the PRC despite ending the costly one-child policy in 2016 with continued loosening of restrictions for having multiple births per household.

Furthermore, the support ratio between working-age and elderly populations in China continue to decline as well as the ratio for children that are also of working age. China’s demographics problem because of the one-child policy is also a reason why the PRC is now considered to have a large surplus male population that is estimated to be between 20 and 40 million. These demographic problems in the PRC are another reason why Moscow may not be too hasty to end ties with China since Beijing currently has a limited window of opportunity for setting up, maneuvering, and defining its great power projection status of the 21^st century. However, it’s also important to note that Russia has its own demographic crisis that is accelerating and may severely limit their ability to benefit off Beijing’s aging issues in the long term as well.

Assessing the Reality and Looking at Possible Geopolitical Solutions and Scenarios

Although Ukraine is receiving military aid from NATO and EU member states it is important to note that the likeliness of a direct kinetic fight with Russia is currently not in the strategic focus of the U.S. and its allies. Proxy wars with the help of third-party actors that are foreign entities like states, private military contractors (PMCs), militias, and resistance groups are likely to be the strategy for quite some time. After all, a European war would cause the U.S. and its allies to get bogged down and prevent them from properly dealing with China’s continued efforts to expand influence and power projection in the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Europe, Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and North America. However, it does not mean there are no other options to consider when focusing on the much bigger issues that revolve around closer ties between China and Russia. The international system is now more multi-polar in nature and that typically means the system is more fragile and prone to being disrupted and volatile.

A fractured Chinese and Russian relationship are in the strategic interests of the U.S. and its allies. Russia is not currently in the position to heal its ties with the West because of the current state of the Ukrainian war as well as its military’s failure to gain a victory within a short time frame. In addition, the diminished ties with European Union (E.U.) states is another obstacle. This ultimately means that destabilizing China’s strong relationship with Russia will have to occur without them switching over to the West anytime soon. If Russia remains in a partnership and strategic alliance with China, it will not only weaken Moscow in the long-term, but also the strategic positioning and power projection of the U.S. and its allies in NATO and E.U. too.

A primary goal could be to take advantage of existing remnants of instability and distrust between Moscow and Beijing because it still lingers in both country’s foreign policy communities to this day. Also, other things to take advantage could be both authoritarian state’s domestic instabilities that are occurring now in real time with street protests and growing public discontent. Getting both authoritarian entities bogged down on domestic civil unrest at home would buy the U.S. and its allies more time to prepare for a stronger, unified, and more effective great power projection positioning strategy that more adequately caters to the new multi-polar system. Regarding Russia weaning itself off its Chinese pivot, it may be more beneficial to the Russian Federation and more lucrative to take a more independent foreign policy approach from China. This can be implemented by encouraging them to take a free agent approach to their foreign policies and geopolitical power projection rather than be completely dependent on Beijing (and led by them), which is even more evident from the Ukrainian war.

A Russian Multi-Vector Foreign Policy Strategy Can Still be an Option for Limiting Russia’s Reliance on China

Back in 2018, this author wrote a blog article called, “Repairing US-Russian Relations is Necessary to the Future of U.S. Grand Strategy” that brought up opportunities for the previous Trump administration to take advantage when attempting to refresh US-Russian relations in the midst of a reversal of the U.S., China, and Russia triangle at the time. The ideas brought forth in this blog article remain relevant four plus years later as the trends of China strengthening ties with Russia were also prevalent back then as well. The big difference is that Chinese and Russian relations are much stronger now than they were four years ago in 2018. However, a multi-vector foreign policy strategy can still be emphasized on the Russian Federation if the scenario conditions were presented to them.

A multi-vector foreign policy is a strategy commonly utilized by Central Asian and former Soviet republics (such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) to help maneuver their countries in regions where they have to deal with both China and Russia at the same time. It’s an approach that they utilize when developing a wide array of partnerships and initiatives based on foreign policy needs and objectives rather than getting bogged down in a single strategic alliance structure. The same can be done by the Russians with the U.S. and China situation. It is important to note that this is essentially what Beijing applied back in the 1970s when Nixon and Kissinger convinced Mao Zedong to shift westward.

A brilliant example of multi-vector foreign policy strategy was discussed in this author’s 2018 blog article that utilized quotes from the 1991 Hollywood movie, “Mobsters” that describes how to counter two mob bosses without going to war in 1920s New York City. The quotes below refer to political and military warfare concepts and ideas that can be associated with Niccolo Machiavelli’s, “The Prince” and Sun Tzu’s, “The Art of War”. The movie quotes say the following:

Meyer Lansky:

• “We gotta get tough with Masseria and Faranzano. Only, we can’t afford a war. They got armies; we don’t.”

Arnold Rothstein:

• “We got balls and brains; you got those, you don’t need an army…100 years ago, Austria was run by a prince named Metternich. Austria was weak, and its neighbors were strong; but Metternich was a cold, calculating fox. If one country got too strong, he organized an alliance against it. He would bring Europe to the brink of war, and then everybody thanked him when he kept war from happening. He barely had an army, but had Europe by the “kishkes”.

Despite the status of the Ukrainian war, Russia still has options outside of being reliant on China. It would depend on a lot of factors that can impact and stress-test the stability and loyalty between Beijing and Moscow. After all, the unique political and war time conditions led to a strict authoritarianism that took to heart the tenets of realism and realpolitik. When this becomes a hinderance in the Chinese-Russian relationship, it will severely limit the level of trust and reliability between the two ancient neighbors. Therefore, a Russian multi-vector foreign policy strategy would be beneficial to the U.S. and its allies since it is very unlikely in the current reality to witness closer and friendlier relations between Washington and Moscow. Although, it may be helpful in repairing US and Russian relations down the road with this strategy as well. Like history, this situation will eventually unfold as well as the story and narratives currently tied to it.

Nothing is New Under the Sun as History Always Repeats Itself in Any International System

It is important to note that the things being mentioned in the previous section and throughout this paper are usually not new situations and scenarios at all. In fact, nothing is ever new under the sun when it comes to dealing with national security, defense, intelligence, and foreign affairs related issues. This is especially true if it pertains to problems and threats requiring adequate and appropriate solutions. In many instances, seemingly new ideas and innovations are for the most part repackaged content that have been repurposed for new and different goals, objectives, and solutions.

Some questions to ask is who exactly is doing the repurposing, why it’s being repurposed, and is the repurposing of the old ideas and innovations both appropriate and accurately fits the problem with the correct solution. After all, the cookie cutter imitation concept is not usually the best answer to solving and figuring out how to deal with a problem and threat. A good example of this would be a friend in a college dormitory who regifted someone with a nice expensive French cuff dress shirt they didn’t want, and it ended up being too small for the recipient to wear. The moral of the story is that repurposed ideas and innovations that are aimed at creating solutions for new but old problems and scenarios should ensure that they work and are solving the problems instead of pouring more gasoline to the existing fires. In other words, it is often best to understand a situation or threat for what it has become. This also includes developing an appreciation for history since it often provides valuable lessons, insights, ideas, and inspiration for the savvy problem solver.

Conclusion

The new international system is more complexed since it has reached a post-globalization period and a new era of rising multi-polarism. These are trends and patterns that have been evolving and cascading for several years and explains why it is essential to understand how the new strategic reality evolved and nourished the immediate concerns that have become primary focuses by leaders, practitioners, laymen, and enthusiasts. With that said, multi-polarism is here to stay for the moment while actors in the international system readjust and reassess their roles and power projection capabilities in a world where realism and realpolitik will be more predominant going forward. These are times where everything and everyone is being tested that include experts, practitioners, leaders, ordinary citizens, established systems, existing partnerships, as well as old and new alliance structures. In addition, it will also require the need to reassess and upgrade the U.S. grand strategy. This will likely become a priority at some point as it will be essential to help the U.S. and its allies address the challenges of 21^st-century multi-polarism more effectively.

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