What Does the Taliban’s Return to Power Mean for China’s BRI Strategy in Central Asia?

By Paul Seibel – Contributor

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an ambitious campaign to develop extensive economic networks across the world that incorporates soft power as a way to compete and undercut the United States and the Western liberal international order. This initiative is a key staple in the PRC’s foreign policy and is a crucial component of their strategy for increasing global influence, domination, and regional hegemony in nations throughout the globe. Pakistan and Afghanistan played a key role in their strategy in Central Asia as the area provides a large source of valuable raw materials and geographically marks a gateway to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Since 2015, Pakistan and China developed close economic ties with the creation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that links the two economies with beneficial infrastructure projects that aid the overall BRI strategy in the long term.

The primary goal of CPEC is creating an infrastructure of roads, pipelines, and railways for transport along with development in energy and industrial cooperation. Afghanistan provides needed resources for the BRI project. In fact, Afghanistan’s resources could provide China with as much as a trillion dollars’ worth of natural resources and minerals, with Pakistan’s infrastructure aiding in the quick transport of these resources. For the BRI to truly function the way the PRC intends, access to Afghanistan’s resources and the development of trade routes across it are necessary. This requires a relationship between the PRC and the Afghan government.

The Taliban’s recent takeover of Afghanistan indicate that the future relationship between them and the PRC remains unclear. They began talks, reached some agreements, and will likely achieve official recognition from the PRC in the near future. However, history shows that these bare little fruit in terms of reality. After all, the Taliban has a long track record of not taking agreements very seriously. The PRC uses lawfare, among the three warfares strategy, to take advantage of existing laws and manipulate interpretations to their benefit. The PRC’s treatment of the Uyghur Muslims within their borders gives strong reasons to doubt that the PRC and Taliban will remain cordial.

The Taliban are in a new situation for them since reclaiming control of Afghanistan. Despite their beliefs and desire to have complete control over their country, they have indicated their acknowledgement that international relations will be necessary if they want to see any economic gains. However, that view is not shared among all the Taliban’s leadership, and if pushed too far, it could lead to serious infighting among the network. An example of this can potentially be the refusal of assistance to groups such as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a separatist Uyghur group, if infighting among the leadership escalates. The Taliban’s predicament, dissonance in their beliefs versus what they need to do, and tensions with the PRC over their treatment of Muslims may lead to a more antagonistic relationship than many anticipate.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The BRI is an expansive project  in which the PRC invests heavily in developing countries and lower-income areas of the world. They have been establishing more cooperation with them and creating an interdependent network of resources and trade. There are many positives of this, such as the ability for some of these countries to capitalize on the aid and grow their economies, creating better living standards for their people. There are also many concerns about this project. The PRC can use the effects, down to the 2^nd, 3^rd, and 4^th order, provided by this project on these regions to take advantage of them. For instance, the PRC offers loans that experts say are difficult for these countries to pay back, and if they cannot, the PRC can take many of their natural resources and state assets that may produce profit such as ports, mines, and industries. In addition, these deals often require providing access of resources like ports to the PRC, or include stipulations where profits from the investments go to Chinese-based companies instead of remaining local.

Another concern with this project is the PRC’s militarization campaign. They have been very aggressive in the South China Sea with territorial claims of territories that are now controlled by other nations, as well as displaying military force and conducting exercises for taking islands. For example, China continues to assert what they consider being their indisputable sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea as well as the adjacent waters without a defined claim. However, their claim is a depiction of being what is considered as a nine-dash line that could ultimately be connected and utilized for enclosing the area that makes up of 62% of the sea. This would certainly reduce access in and out of the region while asserting authority by the Chinese regime.

The PRC has even recently introduced a law requiring vessels to notify them before entering any waters claimed by Beijing, whether those claims are legitimate or not. This behavior in the South China Sea, including the unfounded ownership claims of it as well as building islands for military and intelligence purposes, indicates how the BRI could be used for this as well. The PRC can use these holdings over those countries to place military bases on them or gain access to their intelligence.

Similar to the Silk Road, a major part of the BRI is expanding physical trade routes throughout the world, including through places they have not historically been. This is why Afghanistan is in a crucial place for the PRC’s strategic interests. After all, a significant amount of resources being extracted would be gathered from the region and would then need to travel through Pakistan to continue on to the Middle East, Eurasia, Europe, or Africa by utilizing routes that have been established through the CPEC arrangement. The minerals and precious metals in Afghanistan would be a huge asset to the PRC, and having access to this as well as the means to transport it, while denying similar access to the US and other Western nations will be a key focus for the BRI. In addition, the PRC’s land access is limited given the narrowness of the corridor and their rocky relationship with India. Pakistan and the PRC will each be wanting to make sure that Afghanistan stays more allied to them rather than India, and be seeking to work together to ensure that. As events unfold in Afghanistan, the PRC will find themselves in a position where they will need to adapt to the new reality if they seek to continue implementing their BRI objectives.

PRC and a Taliban Government

In the past few years, the PRC has been unofficially reaching out and began talks with the Taliban that have led to their current relationship status. This has increased in time as the Taliban have reclaimed their power in Afghanistan. Recently, the two have officially met and they each made pledges to cooperate economically and stay out of each other’s internal affairs. These appear to be direct references to the Taliban’s treatment of women and the PRC’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims. Publicly, the PRC is using the Taliban takeover as propaganda. However, it’s not only about weakening US power, but also about how the Taliban have changed to become “more clear-headed and rational.” Formal legitimacy given to the Taliban by the PRC seems very certain because of the apparent cordiality between the two powers and their mutual need for cooperation.

While these may look like an improvement on their relationships on the surface, it does not mean that all is well between these two powers or that things will run smoothly for China’s BRI strategy. After all, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) remains a large thorn in the PRC’s side. This network is actively attempting to create an insurgency against them in retaliation for China’s internment of the Uyghur population in its Xinjiang province. ETIM will seek support from the Taliban, which will put them in an awkward position to support Beijing or not. The Taliban has pledged not to interfere in Beijing’s internal affairs, yet it is in their ideology to support the ETIM.

This is far from the only security concern that the Taliban poses to the PRC. As tensions between the PRC and India continue to escalate, Beijing is utilizing its relationship with Pakistan via the CPEC agreement for assistance. So far, this has not proven particularly helpful to them and is indicative that PRC investment in the Taliban may not fare much better. After a particularly horrible attack on Chinese citizens in 2007, the PRC pressured Pakistan to pursue terrorists aggressively. This escalated tensions and resulted in the Red Mosque and Peshawar massacres as well as the formation of the Pakistani Taliban (a separate group from the Afghan Taliban). Since then, terror attacks continue to be carried out in Pakistan, and despite China’s attempts to help provide security, thousands of Pakistanis have been killed in these attacks. Many of these attacks are targeted at the PRC and Chinese citizens as a direct result of the BRI projects within Pakistan, with both Pakistanis and Chinese being killed or harmed in them. Because of these types of actions, along with the internment of the Uyghurs and other factors, Jihadist groups are beginning to see the PRC as anti-Muslim. As tensions continue to escalate in this regard, the Taliban have formally stated they will not support such groups, even though they support the Haqqani Network and their members continue to support terrorism and designated terrorist organizations on an individual level.

This view of playing nice with foreign entities is not shared among the Taliban leaders and causes much strife within their ranks. Another important factor is that the Taliban have not been known for living up to their word. After all, they did not cease any insurgent activities despite the peace agreements made with the Afghan government. Currently, they have pledged to focus on building up the Afghan economy and not pursue vengeance. However, reports continue to come out in the public realm indicating that the Taliban is hunting people down and dragging them out of their homes for having supported US forces or the Afghan military. The promises and formal statements carry no credibility, which is why there is no reason to believe that the Taliban would change their agreement with Beijing.

Besides these security concerns, there are other obstacles to the BRI posed by the Taliban. The Feminism movement in China has recently gained a lot of ground and successfully led to some important changes. Despite the PRC’s attempts to reassure the public of the Taliban’s intentions for Afghan women, protests within China have already broken out, mostly online, over the PRC’s support for them. Other forms of protests by Chinese citizens have broken out because of the Taliban’s previous attacks on Buddhism and the attack in Pakistan, which have led many to pressure the PRC against the Taliban. Looking at past examples of the PRC’s investment in countries illustrates that it does not always go smoothly. Countries such as Myanmar, Venezuela, Sudan, and others have been significant failures by the PRC, indicating that their investment may not be more effective than US operations to stabilize regions, which also does not have a high success rate. Given their pledge to stay out of Afghanistan’s internal affairs, the PRC would have to rely on the Taliban government to keep security and run the country properly if they were to keep that promise.

As of yet, it is unclear that the Taliban will be able to do so effectively. As stated before, there is much internal strife within the Taliban. Now that their primary objective of ousting NATO and controlling the government is achieved, there will be less incentive for cooperation and compromise among the different internal factions. Internal strife will continue to grow as the Taliban continues to reach out and compromise their morals for foreign cooperation. Thousands of jihadists have been entering Afghanistan in the past several months as NATO forces have withdrawn, with many of these going to groups such as ISIS-K, which seek those who are disaffected with the Taliban and actively work against them. Despite the Taliban’s claims to the contrary, they are formalizing relations with designated terrorist organizations, such as by making Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani Network, a renowned deadly terrorist organization, the Interior Minister of the new Afghan government. This alliance helps them move goods across the region, particularly across border regions into Pakistan, an important part of the BRI. It also causes complication with outside alliances, as forming ties with these groups will make it harder to build relationships with western nations, and continues to cause strife for the PRC. Additionally, much of their conquest across the land was based on making peace deals and bargains with local warlords and leaders. All of this can lead to a quick downfall and collapse of an already fragile society if special care is not taken.  At this juncture, it is too soon to know whether the Taliban will be able to maintain their full authoritarian control of Afghanistan as their relationships with factions and the PRC remain highly questionable.

Conclusion

Fears of Taliban and PRC cooperation are not unfounded. The prospect of it could prove to be a massive asset to the BRI, and the potential for this outcome should not be underestimated. However, it should not be overestimated either. It is still too soon to draw conclusions on exactly how the relationship will play out. There are still plenty of reasons for contention between the two parties, and it is unlikely that either party will be willing to forget that entirely.

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Bonus Material

How Afghanistan Became a Failed State

Source: Caspian Report YouTube Channel