LISTEN TO THE AUDIO VERSION OF THE ESSAY HERE – CLICK!
READ THE PDF VERSION OF THE ESSAY HERE – CLICK!
By Sam Kessler – Chief and Managing Editor ; SDSS President
Malign influence operations continue to play a vital role in cognitive and information wars as they are versatile and can be utilized in both kinetic and non-kinetic warfare environments. These methods are vital and risky to manage, however, they are required for defense against subversive operations by malign adversaries too. It is especially problematic whenever cognitive and information operations are implemented by malign adversaries with the specific goal of compromising the targeted society’s spheres of influence during a time of crisis. However, understanding these dynamics is essential for all members within a society at the government, military, intelligence, and civilian levels.
It is also critical for the reader to note that malign influence operations have existed throughout the history of non-kinetic and kinetic warfare. However, their sophistication and relevance have grown significantly since the end of the Cold War, employed by state and non-state actors who seek to manipulate and generate mass psychosis among targeted military forces and civilian populations. Their sole intention is to achieve a strategic or tactical outcome by disrupting, distracting, and influencing people, systems, scenarios, and events. The end game could be to destroy, wound, distract, or neutralize an adversary to subtly increase power, control, and influence while maintaining plausible deniability.
One key issue that this essay addresses is the need to understand how circumstances and crisises can evolve within an international system that is becoming more competitive, strained, and volatile across the board. After all, subversive warfare operations can be utilized whenever a crisis occurs targeting an unsuspecting population, group, or individual that may be operating under a peacetime umbrella, or atleast the perception of it. Such targeted actions can have significant consequences on the whole system and make it difficult to repair the damage that has been done. This is especially true if it is a global threat that has trickled down to the local levels of society. However, staying mentally aware and prepared in dealing with such vulnerabilities and threats can help the savvy individual and practitioner tackle these problems and realities head-on and doing it with mental clarity, sanity, and reason.
Another primary concern is why the societal spheres of influence inside a society tend to become greatly impacted, impaired, and constantly stress-tested whenever subversive warfare operations are successfully implemented by targeting them within this realm. After all, it is an important reminder on how a society that is affected by stress can be determined by the literal strength of its cognitive abilities to withstand it and the actual threat going forward. Targeting the societal spheres of influences within a society are also precision attacks, which is why American cryptographer, Bruce Schneier, said it best that “Amateurs hack systems, professionals hack people.” Perhaps an addition to this quote could be added from author and strategist, Peter W. Singer, where he said that “deception operations can only work if they are affordable” too.
Before we go deeper into this piece, let us begin by reviewing key definitions for the following terms: cognitive warfare, cognitive operations, information warfare, information operations, and gray zone warfare. Having a basic understanding of these five terms will be helpful for the reader when putting the material and the connections to specific themes into context.
KEY DEFINITIONS
COGNITIVE WARFARE — Cognitive warfare is a strategy that focuses on altering how a target population thinks and acts. It deals with an external entity’s weaponization of public opinion to influence public and/or government policy or destabilize governmental actions and/or institutions (Kessler 2024, 4).
COGNITIVE OPERATIONS — Cognitive operations are simply the implementation of cognitive warfare. The operations are “the coordinated goal (target), scope, location, and time parallel and/or consequent actions, which support influence on the highest level of human thought, outlook, values, knowledge, and interests. Cognitive operations affect people’s perception of reality and decision-making by guiding groups of people and targeted audiences towards conditions desired by a geopolitical adversary” (Danyk and Briggs 2023, 36).
In addition, Danyk and Briggs mentioned that cognitive operations can also be utilized as preventive actions to decrease the risks and threats of conventional or kinetic wars. However, this description can also include digital tools for expansion or colonization via transformations of targeted groups’ outlooks, values, and interests (Danyk and Briggs 2023, 36). This approach would impact the stability of societal spheres of influence and the people involved and impair their ability to defend themselves properly (Kessler 2024).
INFORMATION WARFARE — Both cognitive and information warfare tend to collaborate in the operational realm. Information warfare primarily focuses on controlling the flow and access to information (Bernal et al. 2020, 8-9).
INFORMATION OPERATIONS — Information operations implement an information warfare strategy and support cognitive warfare operations. A simplistic description describes information operations as “actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems” (Kuehl 2002, 36). Information operations include electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations (PsyOps), military deception, and operational security (Bernal et al., 2020).
GRAY ZONE WARFARE –– Gray zone warfare has several names and can fall under multiple vectors and professional fields simultaneously. Other names that fall under this umbrella could be terms like irregular warfare, political warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, unconventional warfare, or non-physical warfare. Either way, it is usually a type of warfare that is utilized by state actors that incorporate a “whole-of-government” approach to projecting soft power that is typically non-military based and at times consisting of having a plausible deniability element. This enables it to utilize the many facets of its bureaucracy, departments, and resources to their advantage via their strategic and tactical operations.
In addition, the gray zone term was initially streamlined by the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Command “to describe activities, actions, or conflict in the space between peace and war (Special Forces Training: Gray Zone 2018). Lastly, Elizabeth Troeder adds that “gray zone warfare has increasingly been the strategy selected by states that are determined to influence change without the risk of major escalation to outright military war” (Troeder 2019).
Now that these five terms (cognitive warfare, cognitive operations, information warfare, information operations, and gray zone warfare) have been introduced in this essay, let’s continue to dive deeper into cognitive and information warfare. It is important to note that these terms provide basic descriptions of important key concepts that should help the reader to elevate their understanding of the material that is discussed in the subsequent sections of this essay. Let’s now continue the deep-dive.
COGNITIVE AND INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE NEW STRATEGIC REALITY
Cognitive and information warfare tends to have the reputation of being taboo, overly complexed, highly sophisticated, and something that is too elaborate to take seriously. This is why it is often treated like a bumper sticker that’s overly simplistic and lacking in depth, particularly when mentioned in reports and descriptions with not a lot of detail about execution, understanding it, or how to deal with its challenges and ramifications. However, it is very much a real thing that is developed by real people with a special set of skillsets that also include an understanding of human nature, patterns and behaviors, symbolisms, societal culture, and the building blocks of society. In other words, it requires a strong mind that is creative, resourceful, and polymathic who can navigate between linear and non-linear environments, scenarios, and events with great ease.
Nothing is new under the sun. However, it is important to note that in the last three decades, malign actors’ cognitive and information operations have escalated during this latest round of globalization. In fact, they have grown significantly during this era with streamlined interconnectedness and rapid changes in technological innovations, cultural shifts, and societal trends. This streamlining of abilities and capacities is a big reason why the US defense, intelligence, national security, and foreign affairs sectors need to update and adapt their operational capabilities and capacities for dealing with influence and cognitive operations by malign adversaries.
It is also another reason why US soft power projection needs replenishment if it is to execute and support viable and long-term strategies that benefit American and ally strategic interests. Without these components that promote a strong, unified, and resilient society, we’ll find increased likeliness of our adversaries to explore ways of further weakening and fragmenting our societal systems, culture, and ability to respond to crises promptly. An adversary’s strategy of incorporating a “death by a thousand cuts” approach may seem small and unimportant. However, they illustrate tactical precision over time and accumulation to the unsuspecting recipient that lacks both a strong big picture and a nonlinear mindset.
After all, the cognitive and information playing field has significantly changed in the last thirty years. Muscle and power accumulation by these malign actors in a world where realism is back with a vengeance requires practitioners in these fields (national security, defense, intelligence, and foreign affairs) to look at the international threat landscape with an updated lens. What happens internationally tends to trickle down to the national and local realm despite best efforts to prevent it. Tracking these trends and catalysts isn’t as difficult to monitor when looking at the big picture and the history of events leading up to the latest situational scenario. It’s important to remember that things rarely occur in a vacuum and that trends tend to result from catalyst events and scenarios. However, be aware of false positives and look for hidden golden nuggets of information and perspectives in the least likely places (aka hidden in plain sight or HIPS). Test it multiple times to determine either validity, relevance, or additional insight for that extra edge of understanding.
“RED TEAMING” OR “RED CELL” THINKING AS A METHOD FOR PROTECTION AND STAYING SANE
A high level of attentiveness and clear thinking is particularly required when assessing the latest situation, scenario, or threat. “Red teaming” or “red cell” thinking is helpful to recognize and identify instances where cognitive threats have been employed on military forces and/or civilian populations. The purpose of a cognitive threat actor is primarily to hack the target’s mind in order to disrupt, distract and/or weaken them prior to a larger scale operation. However, the red team/red cell defender knows this while trying to understand the attacker by determining their strategies, tactics, and actions that can be countered once identified. In other words, they need to utilize empathy and unconventional thinking to understand the players on the other side of the spectrum in order to defend against them, disarm them, and conducting denial and deception operations (DnD operations) against them. Assessing these types of threats in a clear and methodical manner will help a person to act thoughtfully, proactively, and strategically in order determine what is real and what is a false reality. It will also help the person improve their ability to think unconventionally as well as detecting false flags and red flags.
This is where it will do well for practitioners to repeatedly test what they think and know due to the nature of disinformation and misinformation, as well as unsuspecting bias, assumptions, and opinions that can quickly impact world views and objectivity. Incorporating red team/red cell analysis can be instrumental as it helps to stress-test strategies, knowledge bases, perspectives, opinions, preconceived notions, and world views. Red teaming and red cell thinking also helps one become more aware of the threats and missed opportunities, which can ideally make one’s efforts and outcomes more successful and effective going forward. An example that comes to mind would be the use of military exercises to determine strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and cohesiveness amongst forces. However, it can also be applied in the civilian sector to determine how it may be impacted as well as its ability to respond and remain resilient in various scenarios too.
Lastly, red teaming and red cell methods also provide both critical and contrarian thinking, as well as a devil’s advocate mindset, which makes it more possible to increase awareness of biases and assumptions that can make or break the outcome. One basic example could be what strategist and solutions innovator, Max Daves, likes to refer as incorporating a “zig when others zag or a zag when others zig approach, as well as looking at things with multiple vectors,” which helps ensure that the practitioner is not following mainstream beliefs or following the popular opinion crowd perspective that often is not telling a full or accurate picture of the truth. As Bertrand Russel mentioned it best, “if fifty million people say a foolish thing, it is still a foolish thing.” After all, lousy analysis based on insufficient information and targeted agendas leads to bad policies and decisions that can negatively impact lives and societal stability when implemented in the real world in unforeseen ways.
APPLYING “THE TENTH MAN RULE” TO CHALLENGE GROUP THINK BY PLAYING DEVIL’S ADVOCATE AND COUNTERING THE “LIVING IN A BUBBLE” SYNDROME
The “Tenth Man Rule” is a useful method that can correlate with the red teaming and red cell process for assessing threats and vulnerabilities, as well as helping practitioners and individuals maneuver through the cognitive and information battlefield with a sharper lens and preserved sanity. In addition, the concept of the “Tenth Man Rule” evolved out of the intelligence failures that led to the 1973 Yom Kippur War where a surprise attack had caught the Israeli defense and intelligence communities off-guard. As a result, it became apparent to the Israelis that it would be valuable to include perspectives that incorporated contrarian and devil’s advocate thinking into the processes regarding national security and defense strategy, tactics, and decision making. Confirmation bias and assumptions can be detrimental and deadly within a national security realm, particularly when operating within a grey zone warfare environment. The “Tenth Man Rule” seeks to remedy this by requiring alternative analysis and also serving as a check against group think and mirror imaging among peers.
The concept of the “Tenth Man Rule” stems from having 10 people in a room where 9 of them collectively agree and the role of the tenth person is to disagree and point out the flaws and weaknesses in a decision, position, policy, operation, etc. In other words, the tenth person’s job is to take a contrarian and devil’s advocate perspective while assuming that the other nine are wrong no matter how improbable it may seem. This is especially helpful for groups where levels of certainty and understanding are high in confidence. However, it also serves as a firm reminder that not everything may be completely certain nor as it may seem to the human mind. In addition, the “Tenth Man Rule” is also a firm reminder that rigorous and inquisitive thinking processes are essential in order to gain the bigger picture, fuller perspectives, as well as improved awareness of situations, scenarios, and possible outcomes.
Some people may consider this approach to be overkill or time-consuming, as well as being concerned about the reputational stigma that may result from being “the great contrarian” who is challenging popular beliefs. However, improved readiness and awareness from applying the “Tenth Man Rule” can help play a role in saving time, money, and collateral damage for those dealing with situations and scenarios that are sensitive and high-stakes. Imagine gaming out multiple scenarios in advance and finding out that atleast one of them played out in real life. Conducting red team/red cell analysis and a “Tenth Man Rule” approach would have helped the people be more effective and reactive simply because they gained additional insights (in advance) into possible alternative outcomes and scenarios that helped them adapt and maneuver through the situation with an enhanced understanding. After all, less insight and over-confidence makes the individual more blind and less effective when the need to adapt in a timely manner is essential.
COMBATTING MALIGN INFLUENCE WITH STRATEGIC NARRATIVES AND ESTABLISHING RESILIENT SPHERES OF INFLUENCES
Mindset and worldview are determining factors that result in spheres of influence that are either resilient or may erode or collapse over time if not managed effectively. It is especially crucial to understand this aspect if one operates within a wartime environment, whether it pertains to kinetic or non-kinetic warfare. After all, it can make all the difference in the world, mainly if survivability and relevance are in the cards. Creating compelling strategic narratives can be helpful if coordinated effectively and responsibly for the benefit of national security and societal best interests. In addition, societal spheres of influence are crucial for understanding when considering strategic narratives for combatting malign influence.
Strategic narratives are essential for dealing with changing environments and increasing risk factors caused by malign adversaries. Communication strategies have been around in various shapes and forms throughout history in the realm of spinning perception management, persuasion, and informational purposes. It is a simplified description of communications strategies. However, it is a big-picture element that helps serve the purpose of why we have it and how it impacts the lives, decisions, and perspectives of people in all spheres of societal influence. Strategic communications are everywhere, from the local, national, federal, and international levels to the private and public sectors.
The result of strategic communications is especially noticed and influential in the cognitive state and mental health of a society, entity, and individual. In fact, it is often executed to the extent that it either impacts or impairs growth, stability, vibrancy, and culture. How a society and individual responds and reacts to the stress tests of changing environments and dynamics of societal systems makes all the difference in the world. In addition, this is especially true if the stakes are much higher than previously perceived. Understanding these risks and threats is why incorporating strategic narratives can benefit society during peacetime (or periods of gray warfare) and be required during actual wartime, when combatting influence, information, and cognitive operations by malign adversaries.
Societal spheres of influence deal with a wide range of areas of society in every sector that impact or impair its vibrancy and state of being. Primary categorical examples of societal spheres of influence consist of the following areas:
- Social, family, and friends
- Education and training
- Economic, business, financial, and workforce
- Technology and R&D
- Information, news, and media
- Arts and entertainment
- All levels of government and bureaucracy
- Warfare and power projection capabilities – diplomatic, informational, military, economics, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (also known as DIME-FIL).
Focusing on these societal spheres of influence matters greatly as adversarial forces also target them for malign influence operations. This ties in with the role of cognitive and information warfare and the operations employed to implement it in both kinetic and non-kinetic wars. Each of these spheres of societal influence are mainly domestic domain battlefields that occur at the home front but can be used away from it as well. Understanding this reality enables the practitioner or concerned individual to realize how impactful malign influence with a strong cognitive and information warfare strategy can determine the future state of a society’s health, strength, vitality, longevity, and ability to respond to threats.
In addition, malign influence and the role of cognitive and information operations by adversarial and hostile actors are vast and lucrative themes to explore in the new strategic reality. However, it is essential to examine this issue in a period where geopolitical, state, and non-state threats looming in the background have become a harsh reminder in this interconnected reality that nothing ever happens in a vacuum. This reality impacts everyone, especially if one is a policymaker, practitioner in the national security, defense, intelligence, and foreign affairs realm, or even in the private sector where one may be an employee, manager, owner, or even a security and risk management professional. Reality finds itself very impactful on the societies in which these people operate as well as the systems and processes utilized in daily operations, functions, and protocols within them.
Public and private sectors must seriously consider the ramifications of cognitive influence and information warfare operations in the grey zone when assessing threats and vulnerabilities that may significantly impair their normalcy or well-established, consistent, and predictable operating methods. After all, the health of the spheres of influence in a society impacts all who function within it and the ability to respond and counter threats that may occur at the local, state, national, and global levels. The result may exhibit the outcomes being based solely on one’s perception of threats, reality, vulnerabilities, and world view. A successful outcome depends on these elements since perception and cognitive understandings may either empower or impair those dealing with the threats and vulnerabilities within their ranks and systems of operations. Understanding this reality illustrates why it is essential to understand the severe impact of malign cognitive influence and information operations on the societal spheres of influence.
Why the U.S. Needs to Upgrade its Cognitive and Information Warfare Capabilities Against Malign Adversaries in the New Strategic Reality
Cognitive and information warfare may not be on the radars for those who view war solely as a kinetic or physical action. However, it is at the heart of the matter in both physical (kinetic) and non-physical (non-kinetic) war. In other words, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli would agree that one is always in a state of war, whether they realize it (or accept it) or not, and during a supposed peace. With that said, it is a firm reminder that cognitive and information operations must grow and evolve with the times and the need to meet 21st-century realities. New generations of warfare applied by the US (and allies) and its malign adversaries are clear signs that the current non-kinetic war impacts the scale of influence, hearts, minds, perceptions, world views, ideologies, attitudes, beliefs, and mindsets. After all, the level of sharpness in one’s mind can significantly impact or impair one’s level of defense and resiliency if attacked by cognitive and information operations conducted by a malign adversarial threat.
Knowing and recognizing a cognitive and information attack makes all the difference. There is much to discuss about cognitive and information warfare and how friendly forces and adversaries apply it in all aspects of society. However, this author will mainly focus on the growing trends and problems that already impact US national security interests in an international system that is very different than it was right after the Cold War ended. In short, this author believes that the post-Cold War and Global War on Terror (GWOT) eras have evolved into a new period of growing competition, volatility, and multipolarism in a post-GWOT era that has been evolving into a new block-based international system these last several years.
However, this does not indicate that global and domestic terrorism has diminished in importance but that the new strategic reality deals with greater geopolitical competition at the state level as well as with non-state entities. In short, state and non-state entities have more significant muscle and power projection abilities than in previous eras as they have invested heavily in their cognitive and information operations capabilities and capacities. The elevation of this investment has occurred at levels that weren’t in existence at the end of the Cold War throughout the 1990s. Meanwhile, US capabilities and capacities to combat cognitive and information warfare committed by malign adversaries still operate at standard levels throughout the 1990s. It is safe to assume that the level and scale of cognitive and information operations that US adversaries implemented completely differ between thirty years ago and in this current era of increased competition and volatility in the international system.
Cognitive and information operations can be utilized for both defensive and offensive purposes by allies and adversaries for various purposes. David Papalarado, a French Air Force and space officer, mentioned this in his 2022 War on the Rocks article when he wrote that:
“Using false information to gain an advantage over one’s opponent is nothing new in the history of strategy. Churchill, for example, is said to have told Stalin, “In wartime, the truth was so precious that it should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” (David Pappalardo, 2022).
This quote is a firm reminder on the complexities of public messaging, strategic communications, and the scale of influence programs where disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda warfare become tools by all parties involved. History has repeatedly proven that a volatile system and its complexities at the international level often trickle down to the domestic and local levels over time. The determining factor is usually the scale of cognitive and information operations by all sides, as well as the status of the threat levels that may reach the boiling point of the existing non-kinetic conflict. If this reaches a point of no return, then the evolving scenario could result into a full-blown kinetic war.
This is where measuring spheres of influence and soft power projection capabilities occurs in terms of success, and the cognitive and information efforts by all sides seeking to compete and win with minimal collateral damage. The fine line is often considered the entry to the point of no return in scenarios if the players fail to fully grasp the realities within a cognitive and information warfare environment. Some people may solely prefer having a mental state of stability over clarity, sanity, and reason within a world that may be full of orchestrated contradictions, deceptions, and confusions, rather than having to embrace the elements of truth and reality. However, applying this approach tends to create a false sense of security that rarely lasts and ends up making the person or entity even more cognitively compromised and ineffective as a result of it.
The big question that will constantly have to be addressed is if the individual or institution will be ready and prepared for the deception campaigns of both the current and future periods, or if they’ve been unknowingly outwitted and marginalized by their adversaries. Analyzing this bit of information about one’s self with a “no sacred cows” mindset can make all the difference in the world. Looking at the good, the bad, and the ugly will help determine both sanity and resilience if an entity or a person is stuck in the middle of a cognitive and information battlefield. In other words, the battle of wits will always remain constant while living and operating in the world of the grey and the realm of the light.
______________________________________
Sam Kessler is a writer, analyst, and consultant with a national security, global security, geopolitics, and business/finance background. He has been a geopolitical consultant/advisor for organizations and has also contributed to other publications and outlets on related topics and issues. Sam has both an M.A. in National Security and Intelligence Analysis and an M.A. in Intelligence Operations (Strategic Intelligence) from American Military University (AMU), which is part of the American Public University System (APUS) and holds a B.A. in International Studies from Bradley University with an Economics minor. Sam can be contacted via his website/blog at www.samkessler.com and his LinkedIn page.
REFERENCES:
Atlas Organization. n.d. “TENTH MAN ADVISORY.” Atlas Organization. Accessed December 12, 2025. https://atlasorganization.com/tenthman.
Benigni, Iain Cruickshank, Kirk Windmueller, Matt. 2023. “Reaching the Tipping Point: Lessons from Combining Kinetic and Information Operations.” Irregular Warfare Initiative. July 19, 2023. https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/reaching-the-tipping-point-lessons-from-combining-kinetic-and-information-operations/.
Bernal, Alonso, Cameron Carter, Ishpreet Singh, Kathy Cao, and Olivia Madreperla. 2020. “Cognitive Warfare: An Attack on Truth and Thought.” Innovation Hub. NATO / John Hopkins. 2020. https://innovationhub-act.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Cognitive-Warfare.pdf.
Bose, Christian . 2020. “The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare.” National Defense University Press. Hachette Books. 2020. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2541993/the-kill-chain-defending-america-in-the-future-of-high-tech-warfare/.
Chin, Christopher H., Nicholas P. Schaeffer, Christopher J. Parker, and Joseph O. Janke. 2023. “When Dragons Watch Bears: Information Warfare Trends and Implications for the Joint Force.” National Defense University Press. May 4, 2023. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3379870/when-dragons-watch-bears-information-warfare-trends-and-implications-for-the-jo/.
Deibler, Danielle, and Max Lesser. 2024. “Navigating the Nexus between Cyber Operations and Influence Operations.” Foundation for Defense of Democracies. April 30, 2024. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/04/30/navigating-the-nexus-between-cyber-operations-and-influence-operations/.
Fingar, C. Thomas . 2008. “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.” DNI. November 2008. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global%20Trends_2025%20Report.pdf.
“Gray Zone.” 2015. Special Forces Training. 2015. https://specialforcestraining.info/topics/gray-zone.html.
Hoffman, Bryce. n.d. “What Is Red Teaming?” Red Team Thinking. https://www.redteamthinking.com/what-is-red-teaming.
Hoffman, Bryce G. 2017. Red Teaming: How Your Business Can Conquer the Competition by Challenging Everything. New York: Crown Business.
Inspector General at Department of Defense. 2025. “Evaluation of the DoD Military Information Support Operations Workforce.” US Department of Defense. DoD Inspector General. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/27/2003421651/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2024-068_REDACTED_SECURED.PDF.
Kessler, Sam. 2024. “Cognitive and Information Warfare in the New Strategic Reality: Examining the Need for Upgrading U.S. Offensive and Defensive Capabilities against Malign Adversaries.” SDSS Fulcrum Global. https://fulcrumglobal.us/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Kessler_2024_Capstone.pdf.
Kessler, Sam . 2017. “China-Russia Relations After Crimea: Examining the Path Leading to a Formalized Alliance and the Threat to U.S. Soft Power Management.” Sam Kessler Website. August 2017. https://samkessler.com/-/grad-school-thesis-sam-kessler/.
Klooster, Susan van ‘t, and Marjolijn Haasnoot. 2020. “Detecting Non-Linear Change ‘Inside-The-System’ and ‘Out-of-The-Blue.’” Integration and Implementation Insights. January 14, 2020. https://i2insights.org/2020/01/14/detecting-non-linear-change/.
Kuehl, Daniel. 2002. “Information Operations, Information Warfare, and Computer Network Attack: Their Relationship to National Security in the Information Age.” Digital Commons USNWC. International Law Studies 76, no. 1 (January): 23. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1400&context=ils.
Mad Scientist Laboratory. 2019. “‘Tenth Man’ – Challenging Our Assumptions about the Operational Environment and Warfare (Part 2) – Mad Scientist Laboratory.” US Army. October 7, 2019. https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/182-tenth-man-challenging-our-assumptions-about-the-operational-environment-and-warfare-part-2/.
Mearsheimer, John. 2019. “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order.” International Security 43, no. 4 (April): 7–50. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342.
Meyer, Chris. 2021. “The Tenth Man Rule: How to Take Devil’s Advocacy to Another Level.” The Mind Collection. April 12, 2021. https://themindcollection.com/the-tenth-man-rule-devils-advocacy/.
New America. 2025. “The Future of Deception in War: Lessons from Ukraine.” YouTube. May 27, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_qkKzmY8oH0.
Pappalardo, David. 2022. “‘Win the War before the War?’: A French Perspective on Cognitive Warfare.” War on the Rocks. August 1, 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/win-the-war-before-the-war-a-french-perspective-on-cognitive-warfare/.
Ryan, Mick, and Peter W. Singer. 2025. “Ukraine and the Future of Deception in War.” Defense One. June 5, 2025. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/06/ukraine-and-future-deception-war/405821/.
Toronto Star. 2017. “How Israeli Intelligence Failures Led to a ‘Devil’s Advocate’ Role.” Toronto Star. May 21, 2017. https://www.thestar.com/news/insight/how-israeli-intelligence-failures-led-to-a-devils-advocate-role/article_2189cca3-c059-5608-a666-40656f907534.html.
Troeder, Elzabeth. 2019. “A Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare a Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare.” Army War College Press. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1935&context=monographs.
U.S. Army 4th Psyop Group. 2022. “GHOSTS in the MACHINE.” Www.youtube.com. May 2, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VA4e0NqyYMw.
Yadav, Kamya, Martin J. Riedl, Alicia Wanless, and Samuel Woolley. 2023. “What Makes an Influence Operation Malign?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/08/what-makes-an-influence-operation-malign?lang=en.
Yuriy Danyk, and Chad M Briggs. 2023. “Modern Cognitive Operations and Hybrid Warfare.” Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. 2023. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol16/iss1/3/.
Zenko, Micah. 2015. Red Team : How to Succeed by Thinking like the Enemy. New York: Basic Books, A Member Of The Perseus Books Group.
Leave a Reply